PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 4

4
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate
Just off the second-floor corridor connecting the central part of the U.S. Capitol building with the Senate wing is the restored old Senate chamber, where visitors can look around and imagine the room echoing with great debates of the past. Action there gave the Senate its reputa­tion as the "world's greatest deliberative body," where no topic was too controversial for open debate.
In most respects, that reputation is deserved and honored. In fact, all five former senators—John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, Robert LaFollette, and Robert Taft—who are pictured in the ornate reception room near the large chamber now used by the Senate were dis­tinguished by their independence and courage, not by conformity.
Today, on Middle East issues at least, independence and courage are almost unknown, and the Senate deliberates not at all. This phenome­non was the topic of discussion during a breakfast meeting in 1982 between Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and Senator Claiborne Pell of
5
5 They Dare to Speak Out
Rhode Island, the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.1 Pell explained with candor his own record of consistent support for Israel and his failure to recognize Arab interests when he told the Jordanian leader, "I can be honest with you, but I cant be fair." Pells record is typical of his colleagues.
Since the establishment of modern Israel in 1948, only a handful of senators have said or done anything in opposition to the policies of the government of Israel. Those who break ranks find themselves in diffi­culty. The trouble can arise from a speech, an amendment, a vote, a pub­lished statement, or a combination of these. It may take the form of a challenge in the next primary or general election. Or the trouble may not surface until later—after service in the Senate has ended. Such was the destiny of a senator from Illinois.
"Adlai, You Are Right, But—"
The cover of the October 1982 edition of the monthly magazine Jewish Chicago featured a portrait of Adlai E. Stevenson III, Democratic can­didate for governor of Illinois. In the background, over the right shoul­der of a smiling Stevenson, an Arab, rifle slung over his shoulder, glared ominously through a kaffiyeh that covered his head and most of his face. The headline announcing the issue's feature article read, "Looking at Adlai Through Jewish Eyes."
The illustration and article were part of an anti-Stevenson campaign conducted by some of the quarter-million people in Chicago's Jewish community who wanted Stevenson to fail in his challenge to Governor James R. Thompson, Jr.
Thompson, a Republican, was attempting a feat sometimes tried but never before accomplished in Illinois history: election to a third term as governor.2 Normally, a Republican in Illinois can expect only minimal Jewish support at the polls. A crucial part of the anti-Stevenson campaign was a caricature of his Middle East record while he was a member of the United States Senate.3 Stevenson was presented as an enemy of Israel and an ally of the PLO.
Stevenson was attempting a political comeback after serving ten years in the Senate, where he had quickly established himself as an independ­ent.4 During the oil shortage of the mid-1970s he alarmed corporate
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
interests by suggesting the establishment of a government corporation to handle the marketing of all crude oil. He warned of the "seeds of destruction" inherent in nuclear proliferation and called for international safeguards to restrain other nations from using nuclear technology to manufacture weapons. Concerned about the country's weakening posi­tion in the international marketplace, he called for government-directed national economic strategies to meet the challenge of foreign competi­tion.
Stevenson lacked the flamboyant extroverted character of many politicians. Time magazine described him as "a reflective man who seems a bit out of place in the political arena."5 Effective in committee, where most legislation is hammered out, he did not feel comfortable lining up votes.6 "I'm not a backslapper or logroller," he said. "I don't feel effective running about buttonholing Senators."
Chicago Daily News columnist Mike Royko wrote of Stevenson's lack of charisma in a tone of affectionate teasing:
The most dangerous element in politics is charisma. It makes people get glassy-eyed and jump and scream and clap without a thought in their heads. Adlai Stevenson never does that. He makes people drowsy. His hair is thin­ning. He has all the oratorical fire of an algebra teacher. His clothes look like something he bought from the coroner s office. When he feels good, he looks like he has a virus. We need more politicians who make our blood run tepid.7
Royko could have added that Stevenson also had none of the self-righteousness often found on Capitol Hill. Although a "blue blood," as close to aristocracy as an American can be, he displayed little interest in the cocktail circuit or the show business of politics.8 On a congressional tour of China in 1975 he didn't seem to mind when the other three sen­ators received lace-curtained limousines and he and his wife, Nancy, were assigned a less showy sedan.
During his second Senate term, he became disillusioned with the Carter administration.9 He saw it as "embarrassingly weak" and more concerned with retaining its power than with exercising it effectively. In 1979 he announced he would not seek re-election to the Senate, but he mentioned a new interest: the presidency. He might run for the White House the next year. "I'm going to talk about ideas and see if an idea can
5 They Dare to Speak Out
still triumph, or even make a dent," he said.10 It didn't. Stevenson ulti­mately decided not to run. With Senator Edward Kennedy in the race, he felt he would get little media attention.11 By the time Kennedy pulled out, Stevenson concluded it was too late to get organized.
After a years breather, in 1981 he announced his interest in running for the governorship of Illinois. This time he followed through.
The make-up of his campaign organization, the character of his cam­paign, and the support he had received in the past in Jewish neighbor­hoods provided little hint of trouble ahead from pro-Israeli quarters.
Several of the most important members of his campaign team were Jewish: Philip Klutznick, president emeritus of B'nai B nth and an organ­izer of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, who agreed to organize Stevenson's main campaign dinner; Milton Fisher, prominent attorney and chairman of his finance committee; Rick Jas-culca, a public relations executive who became Stevenson's full-time press secretary.12
Stevenson chose Grace Mary Stern as his running mate for the posi­tion of lieutenant governor. Her husband was prominent in Chicago Jew­ish affairs. Stevenson himself had received several honors from Jewish groups in preceding years.13 He had been selected by the Chicago Jew­ish community as its 1974 Israel Bond "Man of the Year," commended by the American Jewish Committee for his legislative work against the Arab boycott of Israel in 1977, and honored by the government of Israel, which established the Adlai E. Stevenson III Chair at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot. Stevenson had every reason to expect that organized Illinois Jewry would overlook his occasional mildly criti­cal position of Israeli policy.
But trouble developed. A segment of the Jewish community quietly launched an attack that would cost him heavily. Stevenson's detractors were determined to defeat him in the governor's race and thus discour­age a future Stevenson bid for the presidency. Their basic tool was a doc­ument provided by the AIPAC in Washington.14 It was presented as a summary of Stevenson's Senate actions on Middle East issues—although it made no mention of his almost unblemished record of support for Israel and the tributes the Jewish community had presented to him in testimony of this support. Like most AIPAC documents, it would win no prizes for balance and objectivity.
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
For example, AIPAC pulled from a twenty-one-page report that Stevenson had prepared after a 1976 trip to the Middle East just this lonely phrase: "There is no organization other than the PLO with a broadly recognized claim to represent the Palestinians." This was a sim­ple statement of fact. But the writer of the Jewish Chicago article, citing the AIPAC "summary," asserted that these words had helped to give Stevenson "a reputation as one of the harshest critics of both Israel pol­icy and of U.S. support for the Jewish state." Stevenson's assessment of the PLO s standing in the Palestinian community was interpreted as an assault on Israel.
In fact, the full paragraph in the Stevenson report from which AIPAC took its brief excerpt is studied and reasonable:
The Palestinians are by general agreement the nub of the problem. Although badly divided, they have steadily increased in numbers, economic and mil­itary strength, and seriousness of purpose. They cannot be left out of any Middle East settlement. Their lack of unity is reflected in the lack of unity within the top ranks of the PLO, but there is no organization other than the PLO with a broadly recognized claim to represent the Palestinians.15
The Stevenson report was critical of certain Israeli policies but hardly hostile to Israel. "The PLO," he wrote, "may be distrusted, disowned, and despised, but it is a reality, if for no other reason than that it has no rival organization among Palestinians."
Stevenson went on to issue a challenge to the political leaders of America:
A new order of statesmanship is required from both the Executive and the Legislative Branches. For too long, Congress has muddled or gone along without any real understanding of Middle Eastern politics. Neither the United States, nor Israel, nor any of the Arab states will be served by con­tinued ignorance or the expediencies of election year politics.
None of this positive comment found its way into the AIPAC report, the Jewish Chicago article, or any of the anti-Stevenson literature that was distributed within the Jewish community during the 1982 campaign.
The anti-Stevenson activists noted with alarm that in 1980 Steven­son had sponsored an amendment to reduce aid to Israel, and the year before had supported a similar amendment offered by Republican
5 They Dare to Speak Out
Senator Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon.16 The Hatfield amendment pro­posed to cut by 10 percent the amount of funds available to Israel for military credits.
Stevenson's amendment had focused on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, which President Carter and earlier administrations characterized as both illegal and an obstacle to peace but did nothing to discourage beyond occasional expressions of regret. Stevenson proposed withholding $150 million in aid until Israel halted both the building and planning of additional settlements. The amendment did not cut funds; it simply withheld a fraction of the $2.18 billion in total aid authorized for Israel that year. In speaking for the amendment, Steven­son noted that the outlay for Israel amounted to 43 percent of all U.S. funds allocated for such purposes worldwide:
This preference for Israel diverts funds from the support of human life and vital American interests elsewhere in an interdependent and unstable world. ... If it could produce stability in the Middle East or enhance Israel's secu­rity, it could be justified. But it reflects continued U.S. acquiescence in an Israeli policy that threatens more Middle East instability, more Israeli inse­curity, and a continued decline of U.S. authority in the world. Our support for Israel is not the issue here. Israels support for the ideals of peace and jus­tice which gave it birth is at issue. It is, I submit, for the Israeli government to recognize again that Israel's interests are in harmony with our own, and for that to happen, it is important that we do not undermine the voices for peace in Israel or justify those, like Mr. Begin, who claim U.S. assistance from the Congress can be taken for granted.17
The amendment, like Hatfield's, was overwhelmingly defeated.
After the vote on his amendment, Stevenson recalls, he received apologetic comments.18 "Several Senators came up and said, Adlai, you are right, but you understand why I had to vote against you. Maybe next time.'" Stevenson did understand why: lobby intimidation produced the negative votes. He found intimidation at work on another front too: the news media. He offered the amendment, he explained, "because I thought the public was entitled to a debate on this critical issue," but news services gave it no attention. Stevenson added,
That's another aspect of this problem. It's not only the intimidation of the American politicians, it's also the intimidation of some American journal­
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
ists. If it's not the journalists, then it's the editors and perhaps more so the publishers.
Anti-Stevenson campaigners also found it expedient to portray him as a supporter of Arab economic blackmail, despite his widely hailed leg­islative record to the contrary. Stevenson was actually the principal author of the 1977 legislation to prohibit American firms from cooperating with the Arab boycott of Israel.19 But in the smear campaign conducted against him in his gubernatorial bid his legislative history was rewritten. He was actually accused of trying to undermine the anti-boycott effort.
In fact, Stevenson, in a lonely and frustrating effort, saved the legis­lation from disaster. For this achievement, he received a plaque and praise from the American Jewish Committee.20 The chairman of the National Jewish Community Relations Council, Theodore R. Mann, wrote to Stevenson, expressing the organization's "deep appreciation for your invaluable contribution to the adoption of that landmark legislation."21 He added that the legislation "not only reassures the American Jewish community as to the commitment of America to fairness and nondis­crimination in international trade but, more fundamentally, stands as a reaffirmation of our nation's profound regard for principle and morality."
Jewish Chicago, making no mention of Stevenson's success in the anti-boycott effort or the unstinting praise he received from Jewish lead­ers, reported that he encountered "major conflicts" with "the American Jewish leadership" over the boycott legislation.22
A flyer distributed by an unidentified "Informed Citizens Against Stevenson Committee," made the same charge.23 Captioned, "The Truth About Adlai Stevenson," it used half-truths to brand Stevenson as anti-Israel during his Senate years and concluded: "It is vitally important that Jewish voters be fully informed about Stevenson's record. Still dazzled by the Stevenson name, many Jews are totally unaware of his antagonism to Jew­ish interests." The "committee" provided no names or addresses of spon­soring individuals. Shirley Friedman, a freelance writer in Chicago, later identified the flyer as her own. The message on the flyer concluded: "Don't forget: It is well known that Stevenson considers the governor's chair as a stepping stone to the presidency. Spread the word—let the truth be told!"
The word indeed spread in the Chicago Jewish community through­out the summer and fall of 1982.24 The political editor of the Chicago
5 They Dare to Speak Out
Sun-Times reported in June that some activists for Thompson had been "working quietly for months to assemble a group to mobilize Jewish vot­ers" against Stevenson.25
The result of their efforts was the "Coalition for the Re-election of Jim Thompson," which included Jewish Democrats who had not backed Thompson previously. When Republican Senator Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota, a strong supporter of Israel, came to Chicago in October to address a breakfast gathering sponsored by the Coalition, he declared that, as a senator, Stevenson was "a very steadfast foe of aid to Israel."26
"Smear and Innuendo"
A major problem was the unprinted but widely whispered charge of anti-Semitism against Stevenson—a man, who, like his father, had spent his life championing civil rights for all Americans. "I learned after election day there was that intimation throughout the campaign," recalls Stevenson.27
Phil Klutznicks daughter, Mrs. Bettylu Saltzman, who worked on Stevensons campaign staff, remembered, "There was plenty of stuff going around about him being anti-Semitic.28 It got worse and worse. It was a much more difficult problem than anyone imagined."
Stevensons running mate, Grace Mary Stern, recalled: "There was a very vigorous [anti-Stevenson] telephone campaign in the Jewish com­munity."29 She said that leaflets charging Stevenson with being anti-Israel were distributed widely at local Jewish temples, and added that there was much discussion of the anti-Semitism accusation: "There was a very vigorous campaign, man to man, friend to friend, locker room to locker room. We never really came to grips with the problem."
Campaign fund-raising suffered accordingly. The Jewish commu­nity had supported Stevenson strongly in both of his campaigns for the Senate. After his remarks in the last years of his Senate career, some of the Jewish support dried up. "Many of my most generous Jewish con­tributors stayed with me, but the organization types, the professionals, did not," Stevenson recalled.30 He believed the withdrawal of organized Jewish support also cut into funds from out-of-state that he otherwise would have received. In the end, Thompson was able to outspend Steven­son by better than two to one.31
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
Fed up by early September with unfounded charges of anti-Semi­tism, Stevenson finally responded, charging that a "subterranean cam­paign of smear and innuendo" was being waged by supporters of Thompson.32 His press secretary, Rick Jasculca, complained that the material distributed by the Coalition for the Re-election of Jim Thomp­son "tries to give the impression that Adlai is unquestionably anti-Israel." Thompsons political director, Philip O'Connor, denied there was a smear campaign and disavowed the Friedman flyer.
Thompson himself said of Stevenson, "I don't think he is an anti-Semite, [but he is] no particular friend of Israel." The Chicago Sun-Times published an editorial rebuke to this remark: "That's like saying, £No, I don't think Stevenson beats his wife, but she did have a black eye last week.' "33 The editorial continued:
Far more important, the statement is not true; Stevenson as a Senator may have occasionally departed from positions advocated by the Israeli govern­ment, but out of well-reasoned motives and a genuine desire to secure a lasting peace for the area. Thompsons coy phrasing was a reprehensible appeal to the voter who measures a candidate s worth by a single, rubbery standard.
The only Jews who tried to counter the attack were those close to Stevenson. Philip Klutznick, prominent in Jewish affairs and chairman of the Stevenson Dinner Committee, said, "It is beneath the dignity of the Jewish community to introduce these issues into a gubernatorial cam­paign."34 Stevenson campaign treasurer Milton Fisher said: "Adlais views are probably consistent with 40 percent of the Knesset [Israeli parliament]."
Stevenson was ultimately defeated in the closest gubernatorial elec­tion in the states history. The margin was 5,074 votes—one-seventh of one percent of the total 3.5 million votes cast.
The election was marred by a series of mysterious irregularities, which Time magazine described as "so improbable, so coincidental, so questionable that it could have happened only in Wonderland, or the Windy City."35 On election night ballot boxes from fifteen Chicago precincts inexplicably disappeared, and others turned up in the homes or cars of poll workers. Stevenson asked for a recount—past recounts had resulted in shifts of 5,000 to 7,000 votes—but the Illinois Supreme
5 They Dare to Speak Out
Court denied his petition by a 4-to-3 vote.36 Judge Seymour Simon, a Democrat, joined the three Republicans on the court in voting against Stevensons request.
A post-election editorial in a suburban Chicago newspaper acknowl­edged the impact of the concerted smear campaign on the election outcome:
An intense last-minute effort among Chicago-area Jews to thwart Adlai Stevensons attempt to unseat Illinois Governor James Thompson in last Tuesday's election may have succeeded. The weekend before the election many Chicago and suburban rabbis spoke out against Stevenson and there were thousands of pamphlets and leaflets distributed in Jewish areas ... all attacking the former Senator.
After describing the attack, the editorial concluded,
The concentrated anti-Stevenson campaign, particularly since it went largely unanswered, almost surely cost him thousands of votes among the 248,000 Chicago-area Jews—266,000 throughout the state—who traditionally have leaned in his direction politically.37
Campaign manager Joseph Novak agreed: "If that effort hadn't hap­pened, Stevenson would be governor."38 In the predominantly Jewish suburban Chicago precincts of Highland Park and Lake County "We just got killed, just absolutely devastated." Press secretary Rick Jasculca adds, "What bothers me is that hardly any rabbis or Jewish leaders beyond Phil [Klutznick] were willing to speak up and say this is nonsense to call Adlai anti-Israel."39
Thomas A. Dine, then executive director of the American Israel Pub­lic Affairs Committee, gloated, "The memory of Adlai Stevenson's hos­tility toward Israel during his Senate tenure lost him the Jewish vote in Illinois—and that cost him the gubernatorial election."40 Stevenson, too, believed that the effort to discredit him among Jews played a major role in his defeat: "In a race that close, it was more than enough to make the difference."41 Asked about the impact of the Israeli lobby on the U.S. political scene, he responded without hesitation:
There is an intimidating, activist minority of American Jews that supports the decisions of the Israeli government, right or wrong. They do so very
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
vocally and very aggressively in ways that intimidate others so that its their voice—even though its a minority—that is heard and felt in American pol­itics. But it still is much louder in the United States than in Israel. In other words, you have a much stronger, more vocal dissent in Israel than within the Jewish community in the United States. The prime minister of Israel has far more influence over American foreign policy in the Middle East than over the policies of his own government generally.
The former senator reported a profound change within the Jewish community in recent years:
The old passionate commitment of Jewish leaders to civil liberties, social welfare—in short, to liberalism has to a large extent dissipated. The issue now is much more Israel itself. If given a choice between the traditional lib­eral commitment and the imagined Israeli commitment, they'll opt now for the Israeli commitment.
Reflecting on his career and the price he has paid for challenging Israeli policies, Stevenson concluded:
I will have no hesitation about continuing. I wish I had started earlier and been more effective. I really don't understand the worth of public office if you can't serve the public. It's better to lose. It's better not to serve than to be mortgaged or compromised.
Stevenson followed the tradition of a colleague, a famous senator from Arkansas who eloquently criticized Israeli policy and American for­eign policy over a period of many years.
The Dissenter
"When all of us are dead, the only one they'll remember is Bill Ful-bright."42 The tribute by Idaho Senator Frank Church, a fellow Demo­crat, was amply justified. As much as any man of his time, J. William Fulbright shaped this nation's attitudes on the proper exercise of its power in a world made acutely dangerous by nuclear weapons. Dissent was a hallmark of his career, but it was dissent with distinction. The fact was that Fulbright was usually right.
He first gained national attention by condemning the "swinish blight" of McCarthyism.43 In 1954, while many Americans cheered the crusade
5 They Dare to Speak Out
of the Wisconsin senator's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, Ful-bright cast the lone vote against a measure to continue the subcommittee's funding. Because of this vote, he was accused of being "a communist, a fel­low traveler, an atheist, [and] a man beneath contempt."44
Fulbright opposed U.S. intervention in Cuba in 1961 and in the Dominican Republic four years later, and was ahead of his time in call­ing for detente with the Soviet Union and a diplomatic opening with China. When he proposed a different system for selecting presidents, an offended Harry Truman called him "that overeducated Oxford s.o.b." Twenty-five years later, in 1974, the New York Times recognized Ful­bright as "the most outspoken critic of American foreign policy of this generation."45
His deepest and most abiding interest was the advancement of inter­national understanding through education, and thousands of young peo­ple have broadened their vision through the scholarships that bear his name.46 But Fulbright also became well known for his outspoken oppo­sition to the Vietnam War as "an endless, futile war . . . debilitating and indecent"—a stand that put him at odds with a former colleague and close friend, President Lyndon B. Johnson.47 President Johnson believed that America was embarked on a noble mission in Southeast Asia against an international communist conspiracy. Fulbright put no stock in the conspiracy theory, feared the war might broaden into a showdown with China, and saw it as an exercise in "the arrogance of power."48
In 1963 Fulbright chaired an investigation that brought to public attention the exceptional tax treatment of contributions to Israel and aroused the ire of the Jewish community.49 The investigation was man­aged by Walter Pincus, a journalist Fulbright hired after reading a Pin-cus study of lobbying. Pincus recalls that Fulbright gave him a free hand, letting him choose the ten prime lobbying activities to be examined and backing him throughout the controversial investigation.50 One of the groups chosen by Pincus, himself Jewish, was the Jewish Telegraph Agency, which was at that time a principal instrument of the Israeli lobby. Both Fulbright and Pincus were accused of trying to destroy the Jewish Telegraph Agency and of being anti-Semitic.51
Pincus remembers, "Several senarors urged that the inquiry into the Jewish operation be dropped. Senators Hubert Humphrey and Bourke
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
Hickeniooper [senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee] were among them. Fulbright refused."
The Fulbright hearings also exposed massive funding illegally chan­neled into the American Zionist Council by Israel.52 More than five mil­lion dollars had been secretly poured into the council for spending on public relations firms and pro-Israel propaganda before Fulbright's com­mittee closed down the operation.
Despite his concern over the pro-Israeli lobby, Fulbright took the exceptional step of recommending that the United States guarantee Israelis borders.53 In a major address in 1970 he proposed an American-Israeli treaty, under which the United States would commit itself to intervene militarily if necessary to "guarantee the territory and inde­pendence of Israel" within the lands it held before the 1967 war. The treaty, he said, should be a supplement to a peace settlement arranged by the United Nations. The purpose of his proposal was to destroy the arguments of those who maintained that Israel needed the captured ter­ritory for its security.
Fulbright saw Israel's withdrawal from the Arab lands it occupied in the 1967 war as the key to peace: Israel could not occupy Arab territory and have peace too. He said that Israeli policy in establishing settlements on the territories "has been characterized by lack of flexibility and fore­sight." Discounting early threats by some Arab leaders to destroy the state of Israel, Fulbright noted that both President Nasser of the United Arab Republic and King Hussein of Jordan had in effect repudiated such Draconian threats, "but the Israelis seem not to have noticed the dis­avowals."
During the 1970s Fulbright repeatedly took exception to the con­tention that the Middle East crisis was a test of American resolve against Soviet interventionism. In 1971 he accused Israel of "communist-bait­ing humbuggery" and argued that continuing Middle East tension, in fact, only benefited Soviet interests.54
Appearing on CBS televisions Face the Nation in 1973, Fulbright declared that the Senate was "subservient" to Israeli policies that were inimical to Ametican interests.55 He said that the United States bore "a very great share of the responsibility" for the continuation of Middle East violence. "It's quite obvious [that] without the all-out support by the
5 They Dare to Speak Out
United States in money and weapons and so on, the Israelis couldn't do what they've been doing."
Fulbright said that the United States failed to pressure Israel for a negotiated settlement, because:
The great majority of the Senate of the United States—somewhere around 80 percent—are completely in support of Israel, anything Israel wants. This has been demonstrated time and time again, and this has made it difficult for our government.
The senator claimed that "Israel controls the Senate" and warned, "We should be more concerned about the United States' interests." Six weeks after his Face the Nation appearance, Fulbright again expressed alarm over Israeli occupation of Arab territories.56 He charged that the United States had given Israel "unlimited support for unlimited expan­sion."
His criticism of Israeli policy caused stirrings back home.57 Jews who had supported him in the past became restless. After years of easy elec­tion victories, trouble loomed for Fulbright in 1974. Encouraged, in part, by the growing Jewish disenchantment with Fulbright, on the eve of the deadline for filing petitions of candidacy in the Democratic pri­mary Governor Dale Bumpers surprised the political world by becom­ing a challenger for Fulbright's Senate seat. Fulbright hadn't expected the governor to run, but recognized immediately that the popular young governor posed a serious challenge: "He had lots of hair [in contrast to Fulbright], he looked good on television, and he'd never done anything to offend anyone."58
There were other factors. Walter Pincus, who later became a Wash­ington Post reporter, believed that Fulbright's decision to take a golfing holiday in Bermuda just before the primary deadline may have helped convince Bumpers that Fulbright would not work hard for the nomina­tion.59 It was also the year of Watergate—a bad year for incumbents. In his campaign, Bumpers pointed with alarm to the "mess in Washing­ton" and called for a change. The New York Times reported that he "skill­fully exploited an old feeling that Mr. Fulbright . . . spent all his time dining with Henry Kissinger and fretting over the Middle East."60
The attitude of Jewish voters, both inside Arkansas and beyond, was also a significant factor. "I don't think Bumpers would have run without
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
Fulbright predicted that the American people would back Ford if he demanded that Israel cooperate. He reminded him that Eisenhower
that encouragement," said Fulbright.61 Following the election, a national Jewish organization actually claimed credit for the young governor s stun­ning upset victory. Fulbright had a copy of a memorandum circulated in May 1974 to the national board of directors of B'nai B nth. Marked "confidential," the memo from Secretary-General Herman Edelsberg, announced that "... all of the indications suggest that our actions in sup­port of Governor Bumpers will result in the ousting of Mr. Fulbright from his key position in the Senate."62 Edelsberg later rejected the mem­orandum as "phony."
Following his defeat, Fulbright continued to speak out, decrying Israeli stubbornness and warning of the Israeli lobby. In a speech just before the end of his Senate term, he warned, "Endlessly pressing the United States for money and arms—and invariably getting all and more than she asks—Israel makes bad use of a good friend."63 His central con­cern was that the Middle East conflict might flare into nuclear war.64 He warned somberly that "Israels supporters in the United States ... by underwriting intransigence, are encouraging a course which must lead toward her destruction—and just possibly ours as well."
Pondering the future from his office three blocks north of the White House on a bright winter day in 1983, Fulbright saw little hope that Capitol Hill would effectively challenge the Israeli lobby:
Its suicide for politicians to oppose them. The only possibility would be someone like Eisenhower, who already feels secure. Eisenhower had already made his reputation. He was already a great man in the eyes of the coun­try, and he wasn't afraid of anybody. He said what he believed.65
Then he added a somewhat more optimistic note: "I believe a pres­ident could do this. He wouldn't have to be named Eisenhower." Ful­bright cited a missed opportunity:
I went to Jerry Ford after he took office in 1975. I was out of office then. I had been to the Middle East and visited with some of the leading figures. I came back and told the president, 'Look, I think these [Arab] leaders are will­ing to accept Israel, but the Israelis have got to go back to the 1967 borders. The problem can be solved if you are willing to take a position on it.
5 They Dare to Speak Out
was reelected by a large margin immediately after he forced Israel to withdraw after invading Egypt:
Taking a stand against Israel didn't hurt Eisenhower. He carried New York with its big Jewish population. I told Ford I didnt think he would be defeated if he put it the right way. He should say Israel had to go back to the 1967 borders; if it didn't, no more arms or money. That's just the way Eisenhower did it. And Israel would have to cooperate. And politically, in the coming campaign, I told him he should say he was for Israel, but he was for America first.
Ford, Fulbright recalled, listened courteously but was noncommit­tal. "Of course he didnt take my advice," said Fulbright.
Yet his determination in the face of such disappointment echoes through one of his last statements as a U.S. senator:
History casts no doubt at all on the ability of human beings to deal ration­ally with their problems, but the greatest doubt on their will to do so. The signals of the past are thus clouded and ambiguous, suggesting hope but not confidence in the triumph of reason. With nothing to lose in any event, it seems well worth a try.66
Fulbright died on February 9, 1995, ending one of the most illus­trious careers in American politics. Reared in the segregationist South, he left an imposing legacy as a fearless, scholarly, and determined cham­pion of human rights at home and abroad.
Warning Against Absnlutism
James G. Abourezk of South Dakota came to the Senate in 1973 after serving two years in the House of Representatives. The son of Lebanese immigrants, he was the first person of Arab ancestry elected to the Sen­ate. He spoke up for Arab interests and quickly became a center of con­troversy.
Soon after he took office, Abourezk accepted an invitation to speak at Yeshiva University in New York, but anxious school officials called almost immediately to tell him of rising student protests against his appearance.67 A few days later, the chairman of the dinner committee asked Abourezk to make a public statement calling for face-to-face nego­
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
tiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, assuring Abourezk that this proposal, identical to the one being made by Israels prime minister, Golda Meir, would ease student objections and end the protest. Although Abourezk favored such negotiations, he refused to make the requested statement. He explained, "I do not wish to be in the position of placat­ing agitators." Rabbi Israel Miller, vice president of the school, came to Washington to urge Abourezk to reconsider. When Abourezk refused, the dinner chairman telephoned again, this time to report that students were beginning to picket. Sensing that school officials wanted the event canceled, Abourezk offered to withdraw from the obligation. His offer was hastily accepted.
Soon after, Abourezk was announced as the principal speaker at a rally to be held in Rochester, New York, to raise money for victims of the Lebanese civil war. The rally's organizing committee was immediately showered with telephoned bomb threats. In all, twenty-three calls warned that the building would be blown up if Abourezk appeared on the program. With the help of the FBI, local police swept the building for bombs and, finding none, opened it for the program. A capacity crowd, unaware of the threats, heard Abourezk speak, and the event pro­ceeded without incident.
After making a tour of Arab states in December 1973, Abourezk sympathized with Arab refugees in a speech at the National Press Club in Washington. Covering his speech for the AIPAC newsletter Near East Report Wolf Blitzer wrote, "If [Abourezk's] position were to prevail, Israels life would be jeopardized." Blitzer s report was sent to Jews who had contributed to Abourezk's campaign, accompanied by a letter in which I. L. Kenen, AIPAC director, warned that Abourezk was "going to great lengths" to "undermine American friendship for Israel."68 The mailing, Abourezk recalled, began an "adversary relationship" with AIPAC. He added, "I doubt that I would have spent so much time on the Middle East had it not been for that particular unfair personal attack."69
On one occasion in the Senate, Abourezk turned lobby pressure to his advantage. Wishing to be appointed in 1974 to fill a vacancy on the Senate Judiciary Committee, he warned David Brody, lobbyist for B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League, that if he did not secure the appoint­ment he would seek a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee. He
5 They Dare to Speak Out
recalls, with a chuckle, "This warning had the desired effect. The last thing Brody wanted was to see me on Foreign Relations, where aid to Israel is decided. Thanks to the help of the lobby I received the appoint­ment to Judiciary, even though James Allen, a Senator with more sen­iority, also wanted the position." The appointment enabled Abourezk to chair hearings in 1977 on the legality of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. "They were the first—and last—hearings on this sub­ject," Abourezk recalled. "And not one of my colleagues attended. I was there alone."
In 1975 Abourezk invited the head of the PLO's Beirut office, Shafiq al-Hour, to lunch in the Senate and learned that PLO-telated secrets are hard to keep. On Abourezk's assurance that the event would be kept entirely private, eleven other senators, including Abraham Ribi-coff of Connecticut, who is Jewish, attended and heard al-Hout relate the PLO side of Middle East issues. Within an hour after the event was concluded, Spencer Richardson of the Washington Post telephoned Abourezk for comment. He had already learned the identity of all sen­ators who attended. The next day Israel's leading English language daily newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, reported that Ribicoff and the others had had lunch with "murderer" al-Hout.
A major storm erupted in 1977 when Abourezk agreed on short notice to fill in for Vice President Walter Mondale as the principal speaker at the annual Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner sponsored in Den­ver by the Colorado Democratic Party.71 Jewish leaders protested his appearance, and John Mrozek, a labor leader in Denver, attacked Abourezk as "pro-Arab and anti-Israel." Betty Crist, a member of the dinner committee, moved that the invitation be withdrawn. When the Crist motion was narrowly rejecred, the committee tried to find a pro-Israeli speaker to debate Abourezk, with the intention of canceling the event if a debate could not be arranged. This gave the proceedings a comic twist, as Abourezk at no point had intended to mention the Mid­dle East in his remarks. Unable to find someone to debate their guest, the committee reconsidered and let the invitation to Abourezk stand in its original form.
Arriving at the Denver airport, Abourezk told reporters, "As a United States Senator, I have sworn to uphold the governmenr of the United States, but I never dreamed that I would be required ro swear allegiance
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
to any other government." In his remarks to the dinner audience of 700, he warned of the "extraordinary influence of the Zionist lobby." He said the United States "is likely to become, if it has not already, a captive of its client state."
He said, "The point of the controversy surrounding this dinner has been my refusal to take an absolutist position for Israel. There is extreme danger to all of us in this kind of absolutism. It implies that only one position—that of being unquestionably pro-Israel—is the only posi­tion."
The Rocky Mountain News reported that his speech received a stand­ing ovation, "although there were pockets of people who sat on their hands." The Denver newspaper editorialized, "James Abourezk is not a fanatic screaming for the blood of Israel. Colorado Democratic leaders should be proud to have him as their speaker. He is better than they deserve." In 1980, after retiring from the Senate, Abourezk founded the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, which has grown into the Arab American civil rights organization with the largest member­ship in the country. Its purpose, Abourezk says, "is to provide a coun­tervailing force to the Israeli lobby."
Sins of Omission
The Israeli lobby's long string of Capitol Hill victories has been broken only a few times in the past forty-two years.72 Two setbacks occurred in the Senate and involved military sales to Saudi Arabia. In 1978 the Sen­ate approved the sale of F-15 fighter planes by a vote of 54-44, and in 1981 it approved the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) intelligence-gathering planes and special equipment for the F-15s by a vote of 52-48. Curiously, both controversies entangled the American Israel Public Affairs Committee in the politics of the state of Maine.
This involvement began on the Senate floor one afternoon in the spring of 1978 when Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy received a whis­pered message that brought an angry flush to his face.73 AIPAC had for­saken a Senate Democrat with a consistently pro-Israel record. Senator William Hathaway of Maine, who had, without exception, cast his vote in behalf of Israel's interests, was being "dropped" by the lobby in favor
5 They Dare to Speak Out
of William S. Cohen, his Republican challenger. Kennedy strode to the adjoining cloakroom and reached for a telephone.
Kennedy demanded an explanation from Morris J. Amitay, then executive director of AIPAC. Flustered, Amitay denied that AIPAC had taken a position against Hathaway. The organization, he insisted, pro­vides information on candidates but makes no endorsements. Pressed by Kennedy, Amitay promised to issue a letter to Hathaway compliment­ing him on his support of Israel.
The letter was sent, but the damage had already been done.74 While Amitay was technically correct—AIPAC does not formally endorse can­didates for the House or Senate—the lobby has effective ways to show its colors, raise money, and influence votes. In the Maine race, it was making calls for Cohen and against Hathaway. The shift, so astounding and unsettling to Kennedy, arose from a single "failing" on Hathaway s part. It was a sin of omission, but a cardinal sin nonetheless.
Over the years, Hathaway had sometimes refused to sign letters and resolutions that AIPAC sponsored.75 The resolutions were usually state­ments of opinion by the Senate ("sense of the Senate" resolutions) and had no legislative effect. The lettets were directed to the president or a cabinet officer, urging the official to support Istael. In refusing to sign, Hathaway did not single out AIPAC projects; he often rejected such requests from other interest groups as well, preferring to write his own letters and introduce his own resolutions. Nor did he always refuse AIPAC. Sometimes, as a favor, he would set aside his usual reservations and sign.
Hathaway cooperated in 1975 when AIPAC sponsored its famous "Spirit of 76" letter.76 It bore Hathaway's name and those of seventy-five of his colleagues and carried this message to President Gerald R. Ford: "We urge that you reiterate our nation's long-standing commit­ment to Israel's security by a policy of continued military supplies and diplomatic and economic support." At another moment, this expression would have caused no ripples. Since the administration of John F. Kennedy, the U.S. government had been following a policy of "contin­ued military supplies." But when this letter was made public in January 1975, it shook the executive branch as have few Senate letters in history.
Ford, dissatisfied with Israel's behavior, had just issued a statement calling for a "reappraisal" of U.S. policies in the Middle East.77 His state­
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
ment did not mention Israel by name as the offending party, but his mes­sage was clear: Ford wanted better cooperation in reaching a compromise with Arab interests, and "reappraisal" meant suspension of U.S. aid until Israel improved its behaviot. It was a historic proposal, the first time since the Eisenhower era that a U.S. president even hinted publicly that he might suspend aid to Israel.
Israel's response came, not from its own capital, but from the United States Senate. Instead of directly protesting to the White House, Jerusalem activated its lobby in the United States, which, in turn, signed up as supporters of Israel's position more than three-fourths of the mem­bers of the United States Senate.
A more devastating—and intimidating—response could scarcely be conceived. The seventy-six signatures effectively told Ford he could not carry out his threatened "reappraisal." Israel's loyalists in the Senate— Democrats and Republicans alike—were sufficient in number to reject any legislative proposal hostile to Israel that Ford might make, and per­haps even enact a pro-Israeli piece of legislation over a presidential veto.
The letter was a demonstration of impressive clout. Crafted and cir­culated by AIPAC, it had been endorsed, overnight, by a majority of the Senate membership. Several senators who at first had said no quickly changed their positions. Senator John Culver admitted candidly, "The pressure was too great. I caved." So did President Ford. He backed down and never again challenged the lobby.
This wasn't the only time Hathaway answered AIPAC's call to oppose the White House on a major issue. Three years later, Ford's suc­cessor, Jimmy Carter, fought a similar battle with the Israeli lobby.78 At issue this time was a resolution to disapprove Carter's proposal to sell F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. The White House needed the support of only one chamber to defeat the resolution. White House strategists felt that the House of Representatives would overwhelmingly vote to defeat the sale, so they decided to put all their resources into the Senate.
Lobbying on both sides was highly visible and aggressive.79 Freder­ick Dutton, chief lobbyist for Saudi Arabia, orchestrated the pro-sale forces on Capitol Hill. The Washington Post reported, "Almost every morning these days, the black limousines pull up to Washington's Madi­son Hotel to collect their Saudi Arabian passengers. Their destination, very often, is Capitol Hill, where the battle of the F-15s unfolds."80
5 They Dare to Speak Out
The Israeli lobby pulled out all the stops. It coordinated a nationwide public relations campaign that revived, as never before, memories of the genocidal Nazi campaign against European Jews during World War II. In the wake of the highly publicized television series, Holocaust, Capitol Hill was flooded with complimentary copies of the novel on which the TV series was based.81 The books were accompanied by a letter from AIPAC saying, "This chilling account of the extermination of six million Jews underscores Israel's concerns during the current negotiations for security without reliance on outside guarantees." Regarding the book distribution, AIPAC's Aaron Rosenbaum told the Washington Post. "We think, frankly, that it will affect a few votes here and there, and simplify lobbying."82
Senator Wendell Anderson of Minnesota at first agreed to support the proposed sale.83 He told an administration official: "Sure, I'll go for it. It sounds reasonable." But a few days before the vote he called back: "I can't vote for it. I'm up for election, and my Jewish cochairman refuses to go forward if I vote for the F-15s." Furthermore, he said, a Jewish group had met with him and showed him that 70 percent of the con­tributions to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee the pre­vious year came from Jewish sources.
The pressure was sustained and heavy. Major personalities in the Jewish community warned that the fighter aircraft would constitute a serious threat to Israel. Nevertheless, a prominent Jewish senator, Abra­ham Ribicoff of Connecticut, lined up with Carter. This was a hard blow to Amitay, who had previously worked on Ribicoff s staff. Earlier in the year Ribicoff, while keeping his own counsel on the Saudi arms question, took the uncharacteristic step of sharply criticizing Israeli poli­cies, as well as the tactics of AIPAC. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Ribicoff described Israel's retention of occupied tertitory as "wrong" and unworthy of U.S. support.84 He said that AIPAC does "a great disservice to the United States, to Israel, and to the Jewish com­munity." He did not seek re-election in 1980.
The Senate approved the sale, 52-48, but in the process Carter was so bruised that he never again forced a showdown vote in Congress over Middle East policy.
Hathaway was one of the forty-eight who stuck with AIPAC, but this was not sufficient when election time rolled around. AIPAC wanted
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
a Senator whose signature—and vote—it could always count on. Search­ing for unswerving loyalty, the lobby switched to Cohen. Its decision came at the very time Hathaway was resisting pressures on the Saudi issue. The staff at the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee was outraged. One of them declared to a visitor: "AIPAC demands 100 per­cent. If a fine Senator like Hathaway fails to cooperate just once, they are ready to trade in his career."85 A staff member of a Senate commit­tee commented: "To please AIPAC, you have to be more pure than Ivory soap—99.44 percent purity is not good enough."86 Lacking the purity AIPAC demanded, Hathaway was defeated in 1978.
Caught in the AWACS Dilemma
William S. Cohen was elected to the Senate, but he soon found himself in a storm similar to the one Hathaway, his predecessor, had encoun­tered. Once again, a proposal to sell military equipment to Saudi Ara­bia was raising concerns among pro-Israeli forces about a senator from Maine. It occurred soon after Ronald Reagan's inauguration, when the new president decided to approve the same request that the Carter administration had put off the year before. Saudi Arabia would be allowed to purchase its own AWACS planes, along with extra equipment to give Saudi F-15 fighters greater range and firepower. Israeli officials opposed the sale, because, they said, this technology would give Saudi Arabia the capacity to monitor Israeli air force operations.87
As it had in 1978, the Senate became the main battleground, but the White House was slow to organize. Convinced that Jimmy Carter the yeat before had taken on too many diverse issues at once, the Reagan forces decided to concentrare on tax and budget questions in the early months of the new administration. This left a vacuum in the foreign policy realm, which AIPAC skillfully filled. New director Thomas A. Dine orchestrated a bipartisan counterattack against arms transfers to Saudi Arabia. Even before Reagan sent the AWACS proposal to Capitol Hill for consideration, the Associated Press reported that the Israeli lobby had lined up "veto-strength majorities."88
AIPAC's campaign against AWACS began in the House of Repre­sentatives with a public letter attacking the proposal, which was spon­sored by Republican Norman Lent of New York and Democrar Clarence
5 They Dare to Speak Out
Long of Maryland. Ultimately, in October, the House rejected the pro­posed sale by a vote of 301-111, but the real battleground was the Sen­ate. Earlier in the year, before the Senate took up the question, Senator Bob Packwood of Oregon, always a dependable supporter of Israel, announced that fifty-four senators, a majority, had signed a request that Reagan drop the idea. Needing time to persuade the senators to recon­sider, the White House put off the showdown. By September, fifty sen­ators had signed a resolution to veto the sale, and six more promised to sign if necessary. Once more, the White House had no choice but to delay.
This time, the Saudis were testing their relationship with the new president, and they left more of the lobbying to the White House than was true in 1978. Their case relied heavily on the personal efforts of Howard Baker, Republican Senate leader; Senator John Tower, chair­man of the Armed Services Committee; and Senator Charles Percy, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Lobbyist Dutton was instructed to stay in the background, although David Saad, executive director of the National Association of Arab Americans, helped orga­nize the support of U.S. industries that had a stake in the sale.89
Dines team roamed the Senate corridors, while AIPAC's grassroots contacts brought direct pressure from constituents. The Washington Post reported that "AIPAC's fountain of research materials reaches a reader­ship estimated at 200,000 people."90 Senator John Glenn of Ohio said: "I've been getting calls from every Jewish organization in the country. They didn't want to talk about the issues. The big push was to get me to sign this letter and resolution."91 Glenn did not sign, largely because he hoped to broker a deal with the White House.
Syndicated columnist Carl Rowan wrote that "there is strong evi­dence" that the AWACS struggle increased "public resentment against the 'Jewish lobby.' "92 The issue was portrayed by some as a choice between President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin. Bumper stickers appeared around Washington that read, "Reagan or Begin?" When the Senate finally voted, Cohen, who had announced his opposition to the pro­posal, switched and provided one of the critical votes supporting the AWACS sale.93 He explained his reversal by declaring that Israel would have been branded the scapegoat for failure of the Middle East peace process if the proposal were defeated.
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
Aside from this "sin," one of "commission" in the eyes of AIPAC, Cohen's behavior was exemplary. Never once did he stray from the fold, and in 1984 AIPAC did not challenge his bid for re-election.
Standing Dp for Civility
One of the most popular members of the Senate, Charles "Mac" Math-ias of Maryland was something of a maverick—a trait that was proba­bly necessary for his political survival. He was a Republican in a state where Democrats outnumber Republicans by three to one.
During the Nixon administration especially, he frequently dissented from the Republican party line. His opposition to the war in Vietnam and his staunch advocacy of civil rights and welfare initiatives earned him a place on the Nixon administration's "enemies list" of political oppo­nents.94 In a December 1971 speech, before the Watergate break-in at Democratic headquarters that led to Nixon's downfall, and while the country was angrily divided by domestic tensions and the war in Viet­nam, Mathias advised Nixon to work to "bind the nation's wounds."95 He urged the president to "take the high road" in the 1972 campaign and to disavow a campaign strategy "which now seems destined, unneces­sarily, to polarize the country even more." In the same message, Math­ias criticized Nixon's advisers for "divisive exploitation of the so-called social issues [through] . . . the use of hard-line rhetoric on crime, civil rights, civil liberties, and student unrest." Mathias was alarmed at what he saw as the Republican drift to the right.96
In 1975 and 1976 he considered running for president as an inde­pendent "third force" candidate in an effort to forge a "coalition of the center." The late Clarence Mitchell, director of the Washington office of the NAACP, said: "He's always arrived at his position in a reasoned way."97 In fact, early in his career Mathias marked himself as a progres­sive and a champion of civil rights, and his constituency took his liber­alism on social issues in stride.98 A resident of Frederick, Mathias's home town, told the Washington Post, "Why, a lot of people around here think he's too liberal. But they seem to vote for him. The thing is, he's decent. He's got class."99
He also had flashes of daring. In the spring of 1981, he wrote an article in the quarterly Foreign Affairs that he knew would put him in hot
5 They Dare to Speak Out
water with some of his Jewish constituents. In it, Mathias criticized the role played by ethnic lobbies—particularly the Israeli lobby—in the for­mation of U.S. foreign policy. The controversial article upset Maryland's influential Jewish community, which had consistently supported Math-ias's campaigns for office.100 Mathias had voted to sell fighter planes to the Saudis in 1978, and his vote helped President Reagan get Senate clearance for the AWACS sale in 1981.
The same year the controversial article appeared, just after voters elected him to his third term in the Senate, Mathias took another step that appeared so politically inexpedient that many people assumed he had decided to retire from Congress in 1986.101 At the urging of Sena­tors Howard Baker and Charles Percy, who wanted another moderate Republican on the Foreign Relarions Committee, Mathias gave up a senior position on the Appropriations Committee in order to take the foreign policy committee assignment.
His committee decision shook the leadership of Baltimore, the largest city in the state and a competitor for federal grant assistance. As the Baltimore Sun noted in an article critical of the move, "Had he remained on the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Mathias almost cer­tainly would have become chairman of the subcommittee that holds the purse strings for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, an agency of great importance to the 'renaissance' of Baltimore."102
Contrary to the assumptions of Maryland political observers, Math­ias was not planning to retire. He had left a committee that was impor­tant to his constituents, but the senator welcomed the opportunity to help shape the issues that come before the Foreign Relations Commit­tee. He was exhibiting a political philosophy admired by former Senator Mike Mansfield, who once called Mathias "the conscience of the Sen­ate," and by former Secretary of State Henty Kissinger, who recognized Mathias as "one of the few statesmen I met in Washington."103
These qualities led Mathias to write his controversial Foreign Affairs article, which called for "the reintroduction of civility" into the discus­sion of "ethnic advocacy" in Congress.104 He acknowledged that ethnic groups have the right to lobby for legislation, but he warned, "The affir­mation of a right, and of the dangers of suppressing it, does not... assure that the right will be exercised responsibly and for the general good."
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
Mathias cited the Israeli lobby as the most powerful ethnic pressure group, noting that it differs from others in that it focuses on vital national security interests and exerts "more constant pressure." Other lobbying groups "show up in a crisis and then disappear" and tend to deal with domestic matters. Mathias continued:
With the exception of the Eisenhower administration, which virtually com­pelled Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai after the 1956 war, American pres­idents, and to an even greater degree Senators and Representatives, have been subjected to recurrent pressures from what has come to be known as the Israel lobby.
He added an indictment of his colleagues: "For the most part they have been responsive [to pro-Israel lobbying pressure], and for reasons not always related either to personal conviction or careful reflection on the national interest."
Mathias illustrated his concern by reviewing the "spectacular" suc­cess of AIPAC in 1975 when the group promoted the "Spirit of 76" let­ter: "Seventy-six of us promptly affixed our signatures, although no hearings had been held, no debate conducted, nor had the administra­tion been invited to present its views."
The Maryland Republican felt that the independence of Congress was compromised by the intimidating effect of AIPAC's lobbying. He wrote that "Congressional conviction" in favor of Israel "has been immeasurably reinforced by the knowledge that political sanctions will be applied to any who fail to deliver" on votes to support high levels of economic and military aid to Israel.
Although he signed AIPAC's letter to President Ford in 1975, Math­ias resisted AIPAC's 1978 lobbying against the Carter administration's proposal to sell sixty F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia. In the Senate debate before the vote, he said that both Israel and Saudi Arabia were important friends of the United States and that "both need our support."
Despite this attempt to balance American interests with those of Israel and Saudi Arabia, Mathias said an "emotional, judgmental atmo­sphere" surrounded the arms sale issue. He quoted from a letter, written to a New York Jewish newspaper, condemning his vote:
5 They Dare to Speak Out
Mr. Mathias values the importance of oil over the well-being of Jews and the state of Israel. . . . The Jewish people cannot be fooled by such a per­son, no matter what he said, because his act proved who he was.
Yet Mathias had already responded to such criticism in his Foreign Affairs article:
Resistance to the pressures of a particular group in itself signals neither a sellout nor even a lack of sympathy with a foreign country or cause, but rather a sincere conviction about the national interest of the United States.
He appealed to both the president and the Congress to "help to reduce the fractiousness and strengthen our sense of common American purpose." The presidents national constituency, he wrote, afforded him a unique opportunity to work toward this end, but Congress, "although more vulnerable to group pressures," must also be active.
Mathias asserted that it is not enough simply to follow public opin­ion: "An elected representative has other duties as well—to formulate and explain to the best of his or her ability the general interest, and to be prepared to accept the political consequences of having done so." He warned that ethnic advocacy tends toward excessiveness and can thwart the higher good of national interests.
The Baltimore Jewish Times reported that Jewish leaders faced "a delicate dilemma" as they considered how to respond to the article:
Basically, they're damned if they do and damned if they don't. If they keep a low profile and do not challenge Mathias s assertions, they feel they will be shirking their duty and giving in. Yet if they "go after" the Senator, they will be falling into a trap by proving his point about excessive pressure.105
Some Jews decided to take the latter course. Arnold Blumberg, a his­tory professor at Towson State University, charged that Mathias "is in the mainstream of a tradition which urged Americans to pursue trade with Japan and Nazi Germany right up to the moment when scrap metal rained on the heads of American GIs from German and Japanese planes."106 A prominent Jewish community official charged that the arti­cle was "malicious" and expressed hurt that Mathias had the "poison in him to express these views."107 Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal, a Democrat from New York and a senior member of the House Foreign
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
Affairs Committee, charged that Mathias was "standing on the threshold of bigotry" and denying "to the ethnic lobbies alone the right to partici­pate in shaping the American concensus on foreign policy."108 Other crit­ics expressed the fear that the article would encourage anti-Semitism.109
A spokesperson for the Maryland Jewish War Veterans organization said Mathias had "sold" himself "to the cause of the Saudis," while a let­ter to the Baltimore Sun chided, "I wish that [Mathias] had had the integrity to express those views one year prior to his re-election rather than one year after."110
One critic, identified as "a former lobbyist," told the Jewish Times of Baltimore,
Mathias is a bright, well-respected legislator who's been effective on Soviet Jewry, but when it comes to Israel he was always the last to come on board. He was always reluctant, and was pressured by Jewish groups, and he resented the pressure. He sees himself as a statesman above the fray. Now he obviously feels he's in a position to say what he really believes.111
The Jewish Community Relations Council in San Francisco criti­cized Mathias in its August 3, 1981, "Backgrounder" newsletter for rais­ing the issue of "dual loyalty" within the "Jewish lobby." Mathias dismissed the charge as a false issue.112 In Maryland, the article was denounced by some rabbis, and Rabbi Jacob Angus of Baltimore pub­licly defended Mathias.
Two journalist friends, Frank Mankiewicz and William Safire, warned Mathias that his article would "cause trouble." Two years later, Mankiewicz assessed the senator's future and said he felt the article had created serious problems.
Ethnic lobbying still worried Mathias. Pondering each word over a cup of tea one afternoon in the fall of 1983, he told me,
Ethnic ties enrich American life, but it must be understood they can't become so important that they obscure the primary duty to be an Ameri­can citizen. Sometimes the very volume of this kind of activity can amount to an excessive zeal.
Some of his critics had not even read his article, Mathias recalls with a smile. "In a way, they were saying, I haven't read it, but it's outra­geous." At breakfasts sponsored by Jewish groups, Mathias was regularly
5 They Dare to Speak Out
challenged. "When this happened, I would ask how many had actually read my article. In a crowd of 200, maybe two hands would be raised."
Did the article close off communication with Jewish constituents? "I can't say it closed off access, but I have noticed that invitations have fallen off in the past two years," said Mathias.
Mathias did not seek a fourth term in the Senate. He told a friend that controversy in the Jewish community was a factor in his decision.
$3.1 Million from Pru-lsrael Sources
Boy wonder of industry, self-made millionaire, tireless Republican cam­paigner for progressive causes—Charles H. Percy was a bright prospect for the presidency in the late sixties. He skyrocketed to prominence dur­ing his first term in the Senate, which began in 1967 after he won an upset victory over Paul Douglas, the popular but aging liberal Democrat.
In his first bid for election, 60 percent of Jewish votes—Illinois has the nation's fourth largest Jewish population—went to Douglas.113 But over the next six years Percy supported aid for Israel, urged the Soviet Union to permit emigration of Jews, criticized PLO terrorism, and supported social causes so forcefully that Jews rallied to his side when he ran for re­election. In 1972 Percy accomplished something never before achieved by carrying every county in the state. Even more remarkable for an Illinois Protestant Republican, he received 70 percent of the Jewish vote.
His honeymoon with Jews was interrupted in 1975 when he returned from a trip to the Middle East to declare, "Israel and its lead­ership, for whom I have a high regard, cannot count on the United States in the future just to write a blank check.""4 He said that Israel had missed some opportunities to negotiate, and he described PLO leader Yasser Arafat as "more moderate, relatively speaking, than other extremists such as George Habash." He urged Israel to talk to the PLO, provided the organization renounced terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist behind secure defensible borders, noting that David Ben Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, had said that Israel must be willing to swap real estate for peace.
A week later Percy received this memorandum from his staff: "We have received 2,200 telegrams and 4,000 letters in response to your Mideast statements. . . . [They] run 95 percent against. As you might
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
imagine, the majority of hostile mail comes from the Jewish community in Chicago. They threaten to withhold their votes and support for any future endeavors."
That same year, Percy offended pro-Israel activists when he did not sign the famous "Spirit of 76" letter, through which seventy-six of his Senate colleagues effectively blocked President Gerald R. Ford's intended "reappraisal" of Middle East policy. This brought another flood of protest mail."5
Despite these rumblings, the pro-Israel activists did not mount a serious campaign against Percy in 1978. With the senator's unprece­dented 1972 sweep of the state fresh in their minds, they did not seek out a credible opponent either in the primary or the general election. In fact, when the Democratic nomination went largely by default to an unknown lawyer, Alex Seith, Jews took little interest. Even Percy's vote to approve the sale of F-15 planes to Saudi Atabia during the campaign year caused him no serious problem at that time.
In fact, only about one hundred Chicago Jews, few of them promi­nent, openly supported Seith. The challenger's scheduler, who is Jewish, called every synagogue and every Jewish men's and women's organization in the state, but only one agreed to let Seith speak. His campaign man­ager, Gary Ratner, concludes, "Most Jews felt there was no way Percy would lose, so why get him mad at us." Of the $1 million Seith spent, less than $20,000 came from Jews. Encouraged by Philip Klutznick, a prominent Chicago Jewish leader, Illinois Jews contribured several times that amount to Percy. Of seventy Jewish leaders asked to sign an adver­tisement supporting Percy, sixty-five gave their approval. On election day, Jewish support figured heavily in Percy's victory. He received only 53 percent of the statewide vote, but an impressive 61 percent of the Jew­ish vote.
The 1984 campaign was dramatically different. Pro-Israel forces targeted him for defeat early and never let up. Percy upset Jews by vot­ing to support the Reagan administration sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, a sale also supported by the Carter administration. These developments provided new ammunition for the attack already under­way against Percy. His decision was made after staff members who had visired Israel said they had been told by an Istaeli military official that the strategic military balance would nor be affected, bur that they did
5 They Dare to Speak Out
not want the symbolism of the United States doing business with Saudi Arabia.
Early in 1984, AIPAC decided to mobilize the full national resources of the pro-Israel campaign against Percy. In the March primary, it encouraged the candidacy of Congressman Tom Corcoran, Percy's chal­lenger for the nomination. One of Corcoran's chief advisers and fund­raisers was Morris Amitay, former executive director of AIPAC. Corcoran's high-decibel attacks portrayed Percy as anti-Israel. His fund-raising appeals to Jews cited Percy as "Israel's worst adversary in Con­gress." A full-page newspaper advertisement, sponsored by the Corcoran campaign, featured a picture of Arafat and headlined, "Chuck Percy says this man is a moderate."116 A letter to Jewish voters defending Percy and signed by fifty-eight leading Illinois Jews made almost no impact.
Although Percy overcame the primary challenge, Corcoran's attacks damaged his position with Jewish voters and provided a strong base for AIPAC's continuing assault.117 Thomas A. Dine, executive director of AIPAC, set the tone early in the summer by attacking Percy's record at a campaign workshop in Chicago. AIPAC encouraged fund-raising for Paul Simon and mobilized its political resources heavily against Percy. It assigned several student interns full time to the task of anti-Percy research, and it brought more than one hundred university students from out-of-state to campaign for Simon.
Midway through the campaign, AIPAC took a devious step to make Percy look bad. The key votes that were selected by AIPAC and used to rate all senators showed Percy supporting Israel 89 percent of the time during his career. This put him only a few points below Simon's 99-per­cent rating in the House of Representatives—hardly the contrast AIPAC wanted to cite in its anti-Percy campaign. The lobby solved the problem by changing its own rule book in the middle of the game. It added to the selected list a number of obscure votes that Percy had cast in the sub­committee, as well as letters and resolutions that Percy had not signed. The expanded list dropped the senator's rating to only 51 percent, a mark that Simon used when he addressed Jewish audiences.
While most financial support from pro-Israel activists came to Simon from individuals, political action committees figured heavily. By mid-August these committees had contributed $145,870 to Simon, more than to any other Senate candidate.118 By election day, the total had risen ro $235,000, with fifty-five committees participating.
The Deliberative Body Falls to Deliberate 5
In addition, California Jewish activist Michael Goland, using a loophole in the federal law, spent $1.6 million for billboard, radio, and television advertising that urged Illinoisans to "dump Percy" and called him a "chameleon." Percy undertook vigorous countermeasures. For­mer Senator Jacob Javits of New York, one of the nation's most promi­nent and respected Jews, and Senator Rudy Boschwitz, chairman of the Senate subcommittee on the Middle East, made personal appearances for Percy in Chicago, and one hundred Illinois Jews, led by former Attorney General Edward H. Levi, sponsored a full-page advertisement declaring that Percy "has delivered for Illinois, delivered for America, and delivered for Israel." The advertisement, in an unstated reference to Goland's attacks, warned, "Don't let our U.S. Senate race be bought by a Californian."
Except for charging in one news conference that Simon incorrectly proclaimed that he had a 100-percent voting record for the pro-Israel lobby, Percy tried to avoid the Israel-Jewish controversy in the campaign.
These precautions proved futile, as did his strong legislative endeav­ors. His initiatives as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com­mittee brought Israel $425 million more in grant aid than Reagan had requested in 1983 and $325 million more in 1984, but these successes for Israel seemed to make no difference. A poll taken a month before the election showed a large majority of Jews supporting Simon. The Percy campaign found no way to stem the tide.
When the votes were counted, Percy lost statewide by 89,000 votes."9 One exit poll indicated that Percy had won 35 percent of the Jewish vote. In the same balloting, Illinois Jews cast only 30 percent of their votes for the re-election of President Ronald Reagan—evidence of their unhappiness with the chief executive's views on the separation of church and state, abortion, and other social issues, not to mention his insistence on selling AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia.
In an election decided by so few votes, any major influence could be cited as crucial. Although broadly supportive of Reagan's program, Percy was remembered by many voters mainly as a moderate, progressive Republican. Some conservative Republicans rejoiced at his defeat. The "new right," symbolized by the National Conservative Political Action Committee, withheld its support from Percy, and early in the campaign indicated its preference for Simon, despite the latter's extremely liberal record in Congress.
5 They Dare to Speak Out
The Middle East controversy alone may have been sufficient to cost Percy his Senate seat. Thousands of Jews who had voted for Percy in 1978 left him for the Democratic candidate six years later. And these votes fled to Simon mainly because Israel's lobby worked effectively throughout the campaign year to portray the senator as basically anti-Israel. Percys long record of support for Israels needs amounted to a repudiation of the accusation, but too few Jews spoke up publicly in his defense. The senator found that once a candidate is labeled anti-Israel, the poison sinks so swiftly and deeply it is almost impossible to remove.
The Middle East figured heavily in campaign financing as well as voting.120 Simons outlay for the year was $5.3 million, Percys about $6 million. With Goland spending $1.6 million in his own independent attack on Percy, total expenditures on behalf of the Simon candidacy came to $6.9 million.
Forty percent—$3.1 million—of Simons campaign financing came from Jews who were disgruntled over Percys position on Arab-Israel relations. Indeed, Simon was promised half this sum before he became a candidate. While he was still pondering whether to vacate his safe seat in the House of Representatives in order to make the race, he was assured $1.5 million from Jewish sources. The promise came from Robert Schrayer, Chicago area businessman and leader in the Jewish community, whose daughter, Elizabeth, was helping to organize anti-Percy forces in her job as assistant director of political affairs for AIPAC.
Reviewing the impact of the Middle East controversy on his defeat, Percy says, "Did it make the difference? I don't know. But this I believe: I believe Paul Simon would not have run had he not been assured by Bob Schrayer that he would receive the $1.5 million."121 Simon acknowledges, "This assurance was a factor in my decision."
AIPAC's Thomas A. Dine told a Canadian audience: "All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And American politicians—those who hold public positions now, and those who aspire—got the message."122
"Leave the Grandstanding to Others"
The message came through so loud, so clear, that some senators now find it necessary to confer with AIPAC executives before introducing
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
legislation related to the Middle East. One such politician is Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), who in the 2000 elections won out over her challenger, former Representative and critic of Israel Tom Campbell. Feinstein went on to sponsor, along with Mitch McConnell (R-KY), every blatantly pro-Israel piece of legislation in the 107th Senate. These senators reportedly conferred with Howard Kohr, executive director of AIPAC, before drafting their legislation. Kohr claims to receive "dozens of calls" from lawmakers asking what they can do to help Israel.
On May 2, 2002, Feinstein and McConnell introduced Senate Res­olution 247 which, like Tom DeLay s "Israel First" resolution in the House, criticized the Palestinian Authority, condemned suicide bomb­ings, and made no mention whatsoever of Israeli aggression. Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), was appalled:
Nowhere in this resolution is Israel called upon to fulfill its role in work­ing for peace in the Middle East. ... If the Senate is serious about pro­moting peace in the Middle East—and I believe to the depths of my soul that we are—then we should leave the grandstanding to others. We should support the real work of peacekeeping. . . . This is not the time for the United States Senate to wade into the fray waving a sledgehammer in the form of an ill-timed, ill-advised, and one-sided resolution, and I intend to
• 123
vote against it.